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Abstract 
This study aims to find out the impact of ownership structure on firm s’ earning management. Ownership structure 
is divided into two categories: ownership concentration and ownership mix. Banking sector of Pakistan was chosen 
for this study and 20 banks were selected. Study period was 2000-2012. Data was collected related to ownership 
concentration and ownership mix variables. Results showed that independent variables including major 
shareholders, directors, government and financial institutions negatively affect earnings management of banks. 
Ownership by local, foreign investors/companies and associated organizations’ ownership positively affects 
earning management of banks. 
Keywords: Ownership concentration, ownership mix, earning management 
 
1 Introduction   
Ownership should be separated from control and authority in firms and it is common in the today’s business world 
as more organizations are listed on stock exchanges. However, this separation raises serious problems and conflicts 
between the shareholders of a firm and the managers. Managers are in authority and may have the incentive to 
transfer wealth in terms of bonuses or other benefits at the expense of the owners (Mashayekhi, 2008). In this 
regard, shareholders may face costs to observe the management and its activities from such unethical actions. This 
division of ownership and authority creates agency problems. This argument is consistent with (Levitt, 1998) who 
find a significant positive relationship between agency conflicts, and the degree of division between ownership 
and control. The result in the study shows that as the degree of separation between ownership and power increases, 
the agency problem and costs increases. Therefore, effective power and observation is needed to reduce agency 
problems and costs.  
Prior research finds that effective corporate governance systems quality external audits and managerial 
ownerships will decrease agency problems in the organizations. Managers who own shares of an organization have 
less motivation to change reported accounting information. When ownership by managers increases, then gap 
between the motives and objectives of the managers and the shareholders decreases. They want to maximize their 
wealth at cost of shareholders. Therefore, we can say that as management ownership is more, the motivation to 
manipulate earnings will decrease. However, there are studies that do not find a negative relationship between 
managerial ownerships and agency problems (Bolton, Scheinkman, & Xiong, 2006).  
Results in a study by Ali et al. (2008) may be used to explain the role of managerial ownership in 
minimizing the agency problems. It was found that organizational size is one important factor that can produce 
different results in previous research. However, the organization size effect has never been rightly researched that 
involve managerial ownership and earnings management and represent agency problems. Many studies used 
organizational size as main variable (Warfield, Wild, & Wild, 1995). In East Asian organizations, the relationship 
between managerial ownership and agency problem is compared to western countries. The existence of significant 
major shareholders ownership can become a good tool to keep an eye on managerial motives when there is a low 
level of managerial ownership. If the organizational size is a vital factor which determines the agency conflicts, it 
is good for the investors to have a good corporate governance system in the form of managerial ownership 
according to the magnitude of companies.   
Banking sector of Pakistan is a well organized sector and is performing better in last few years. It contains 
different categories of banks i.e. local banks, foreign banks, Islamic banks, public and private banks. Ownership 
structure of every bank is different and it affects its financial performance. In this study ownership structure is 
explained by two types i.e. ownership concentration and ownership mix (foreign, government, outsiders and family 
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ownership) is studied to find out the relationship between ownership structure and earning management.  
This study uses earnings management proxy as agency conflict measurement. This measurement is better 
than firm performance because the performance itself can be managed. There is a substantial amount of literature 
about the effects of ownership structure on earning management from developed countries like UK, US and 
European countries. However, there is a gap in systematic facts for developing countries, especially for Pakistan.  
This study is not done in Pakistan before and on banking sector. Banking sector plays an important part in 
strengthen the economy and it needs to be studied in relation with its shareholding patterns and its affect on its 
earnings management. The contribution of this paper is that it aims to contribute to the body of knowledge and it 
focuses on finding out the impact of ownership structure, whether it is concentrated or mix, on the earnings 
management of the banking sector in Pakistan. 
 
2 Literature Review 
Earlier empirical studies show that companies with family ownership are associated with higher earnings quality 
and greater earning information (Ali, Salleh, & Hassan, 2008). This has caught substantial interest from researchers 
especially in East Asia since family owned company is a common there. It is argued that controlling families hide 
their self-oriented behavior by manipulating earning numbers which result in agency problem. Earnings 
management occurs when managers use personal opinion in financial reporting and in structuring transactions to 
modify financial reports to either mislead shareholders about the financial performance of the company or to 
influence financial results that depend on reported accounting numbers. This can be related to the well known 
cases of accounting fraud and earnings changing at Enron and WorldCom which have caught the attention of 
investors and supervisory bodies (Warfield, Wild, & Wild, 1995). 
Earnings management is main concept and issue of accounting research for the last two decades. However, 
different researchers have defined earning management in different words. Earnings management is defined as the 
process of taking purposeful steps within the limits of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles to bring about a 
desired level of reported income (Tanewski & Bartholomeusz, 2006). Earning management occurs when managers 
use personal judgment in financial reporting in shaping business transactions. It is also to change financial results 
to mislead some stakeholders about the current financial health of the company. Earnings management can be 
done by structuring of certain income and expense, changes in accounting practices and accruals management. Of 
all these mentioned earnings management techniques, accruals management is the most destructive to the worth 
of accounting reports because investors are unaware of the extent of such changes in accruals (Isenmila & Elijah, 
2012).  
Accrual is defined as the difference between the earnings and cash flow from operating activities. 
Accruals can be further divided into non-discretionary accruals and discretionary accruals. Non-discretionary 
accruals are accounting modifications to the company’s cash flows managed by the accounting standard bodies; 
discretionary accruals are modifications to cash flows selected by the management (Fan & Wong, 2002). 
Ownership structure as explained by the agency theory is one of the most important corporate governance devices 
to solve agency problems and suggests that concentrated ownership will result in more effective observation of 
management activities. Researchers in developed countries focus on the motivations of outside shareholders and 
managers in a mix ownership, in Asia the agency issues shift to conflicts amongst the owners who control and the 
minority shareholders because ownership concentration structures are more common here (Saleh, Iskandar, & 
Rahmat, 2005). 
The concentrated ownership results in agency issues between owners who control and minority 
shareholders, which are hard to minimize during the role of a board of directors. It is said that an efficient system 
can be used to limit earnings management and to develop a suitable ownership structure. It has also been found 
that division of ownership from the power of a company can engage managers in fraudulent financial reporting for 
the purpose of increasing their own personal benefit to the disadvantage of the interests of the investing public and 
bank depositors (Yang, Chun, & Ramadili, 2009). 
An effective controlling system for the management is vital to make sure manager’s action is in agreement 
with shareholder’s interest. Conflict of interest between managers and shareholders becomes clear when there is a 
division between the people who own the organization and the people who manage the organization (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). In the current business ownership structure, this division is foreseeable particularly in large listed 
businesses i.e. the owners are more detached among shareholders and the appointed management may have very 
nominal shareholding. In these firms, failure to observe the management may lead to inefficient resource 
distribution and cause business disgrace (Johari, Saleh, Jaffer, & Hassan, 2008). 
Earnings management practice has caught attention among controllers, accounting standards bodies and 
accounting profession. Although it is not new in accounting job it has been an undisclosed policy among company 
managers (Wang, 2006). Earnings management practices with the intention to manage earnings with personal 
judgment and opinion are considered unethical even though no accounting standards are breached (Levitt, 1998). 
Accounting practitioners and regulators see earnings management as a problem that needs an urgent 
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control action. Research provides substantiation that majority of the people do not believe that earnings 
manipulation is ethical. On the other hand, some think that earnings management is done by organizations for the 
advantage of their investors. Financial reporting can boost firm value if financial earnings and firms’ performance 
is consistent and available on time. So, accounting standards should provide the managers, with the alternatives 
needed to indicate private information on firms’ performance (Healy & Wahlen, 1999). 
Discretionary accruals symbolize the degree of earnings management. Discretionary accruals replicate 
biased accounting choices made by management. The size of discretionary accruals is indicated as a percentage of 
assets of a company. The higher the value of discretional accruals, the greater the earnings is maneuvered. In 
earnings management income may increase or income may decrease and it depends on accounting choices. 
Income-increasing exploitation means positive discretionary accruals whereas income-decreasing point out 
negative discretionary accruals. Incentives to engage in earnings management could be alleviated through effective 
corporate governance system such as board structure, ownership structure and capital structure (Elias, 2002). 
Besides internal factors, good corporate governance practice is also guided by the requirements of Registrar of 
Companies, Securities Commission, Bursa Saham Kuala Lumpur, Bank Negara, Foreign Direct Investment 
Committee and Ministry of Finance. However, having a good set of rules and regulations do not guarantee good 
corporate governance system unless regulatory authorities professionally put into effect these requirements. Board 
of directors’ play an important role in establishing good practices in a company. Directors are in charge of 
monitoring and observing management to protect shareholders’ interest. Directors have to make sure that the 
interest of shareholders and managers are lineup. The issue of interest between shareholders and management will 
arise if managers used earnings management to obtain personal gains (Weisbach, 1998).  
Ownership structure of a firm can be categorized into two groups: proportion of shares owned by insiders 
and outsiders; proportion of shares owned by institutional versus individual shareholders. For the insider and 
outsider shareholders category, it was found that managerial ownership is negatively linked with earnings 
exploitation. Managerial ownership might decrease the agency conflicts as the objectives of managers are lineup 
closely to the objectives of other shareholders. Institutional investors are large investor, who uses personnel 
judgment over investment of others. Organizations which are considered as institutional investors are insurance 
companies, pension funds, investment trusts, financial institutions, investment companies. Institutional investors 
have the opportunity, resources and ability to monitor, discipline and control a manager’s decision in the firm. 
McConnell and Servaes (1990) argued that institutional share ownership may have application for earnings 
management as they are able to manipulate the company’s management. The results show that institutions with 
large shareholdings play a dynamic role in controlling managerial actions in managing the reported earnings. This 
is because when the institutions invest in the long term period, they are more concerned about the effectiveness of 
the companies and be vigilant of the use of discretional accruals to handle the earnings. 
Earnings management let management and insiders to deceive stakeholders about the actual performance 
of the organization. Ownership structure of a firm affects earnings management behavior of firms in emerging 
markets. Previous literature shows a strong relationship between the two by showing higher ownership 
concentration, high institutional ownership, presence of foreign investors as a vital factors effecting earnings 
management (Bolton, Scheinkman, & Xiong, 2006). 
Ownership structure effects earnings management due to its ability to decide how businesses choose to 
reveal its financial information. Organizations with concentrated ownership vest more powers in the hands of 
major shareholder who tend not to release all information in order to collect personal benefits of control. The 
presence of institutional investors in the ownership structure result in better observation and control of 
management and give better information about company. Ownership concentration is a governance system that 
allows the major shareholder to boost power over board behavior and decisions. Concentrated ownership is 
common in countries with weak legal protection of minority shareholders. In these countries, getting authority 
over administration decreases issues of interests between managers and shareholders and thus reduces the agency 
conflicts. However, control by one shareholder over organization’s activities produce agency problems between 
major shareholder and minority shareholders (Gedajlovic & Shapiro, 2002). 
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3  Theoretical Framework  
 
Fig. 1     Impact of ownership structure on earning management 
Ownership concentration is divided into shares held by directors, major shareholders, associated 
companies and government. Ownership mix is divided into shares held by local individuals (general public), 
foreign investors/companies and financial institutions. Earning management is measured by using discretionary 
and total accruals.  In this model Dir_own shows the percentage of total shares held by directors of a bank. Concent 
shows the percentage of total shares held by major shareholders of a bank. Sister shows the percentage of total 
shares held by associated or related companies of a bank. Govt shows the percentage of total shares of a bank held 
by government. Lown shows the percentage of total shares of a bank held by Local individuals. Fown shows the 
percentage of total shares of a bank held by foreign investor/companies. Finn shows the percentage of total shares 
of a bank held by financial institutions. 
 
For we have formed following hypothesis 
H1: Ownership by Directors significantly impacts banks’ earning management 
H2:  Ownership by major shareholders significantly impacts banks’ earning management  
H3: Ownership by sister organizations significantly impacts banks’ earning management 
H4: Ownership by government significantly impacts banks’ earning management 
H5: Ownership by local individuals significantly impacts banks’ earning management 
H6: Ownership by foreign investors significantly impacts banks’ earning management  
H7: Ownership by financial institutions significantly impacts banks’ earning management  
 
Methodology 
Pakistani banking sector was chosen for this study. Data of year 2005-2012 were used in this study. Annual reports 
of 20 banks were used to collect the data on shareholding pattern and firm performance in form managing of 
earnings. Regression model was formulated to find the impact of ownership structure on earning management by 
banks. Following is the regression model for all dependent variables and independent variables: 
EM= α + β1(dir_own) + β2(concent) +β3(sister) +β4(govt) + β5(lown) +β6(fown) +β7(finn) +µ 
Dir_own= Director Ownership 
Concent= concentration representing major shareholders’ ownership 
Sister= associated and related organizations 
Govt= government 
Lown= local individuals 
Fown= Foreign individuals and companies 
Finn= Financial institutions 
EM= earning management measured by total and discretionary accruals   
To measure earning management both total accruals and discretionary accruals are used. Following Haribar and 
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Collins (2002) total accruals are estimated as follow: 
TA= ᇫCA-  ᇫCL -ᇫ CASH + ᇫ STDEBT-DEP 
In this model TA is the total accruals in year t for the firm, ᇫCA is change in current assets from year t-1 to year 
t for the firm, ᇫCL is the change in current liabilities from year t-1 to year t for the firm, ᇫ CASH is the change 
in cash from year t-1 to year t for the firm, ᇫ STDEBT  is the change in short term debt from year t- 1 to year t 
for firm, and DEP is the depreciation expense in year t for the firm. 
To estimate the discretionary accruals, the modified Jones model is used: 
DA=
1
1
−tA
+
1−
∆−∆
tA
RECREV
+ µ
1
+
−tA
PPE
 
Where it TA is the total accruals in year t for the firm, 1−tA  is total assets in year t-1 for the firm, REV∆  is 
revenues in year t less revenues in year t-1 to year t for the firm, REC∆  is net receivables in year t less net 
receivable in year t-1 for the firm, PPE is gross property, plant and equipment in year t for the firm, and µ is 
stochastic term in year t for the firm (unexplained component of total accruals). After calculating earnings 
management by using above models data was transformed into binary numbers of 0 and 1. No autocorrelation was 
found due to transformation of variables. Method used for analysis is Generalized Least Square Method and Pooled 
EGLS panels are used. Cross section weights were used in order to control heteroskedasticity. Linear estimation 
after one-step weighting matrix is also applied. 
 
Data findings 
Table 1 is showing results for Pooled EGLS. This table is showing that ownership by directors, major shareholders, 
government and financial institutions have negative impact on earning management. It means that they can 
manipulate the earnings for their own interests. They also influence the decision making at top level. We can see 
that these values are highly significant with negative sign. If shares of a bank are owned by its sister organizations, 
local and foreign investors then they effect positively earning management. The values of these variables are highly 
significant at probability value. Value of R2 and adjusted R2 is not high but it is representing the contribution of 
these variables towards earning management in an organization. Adjusted R-squared measures the proportion of 
variance in the dependent variable that was explained by the variations in the independent variable. So H3, H5 and 
H6 are accepted. Here 36.44% variance in earning management of bank is explained by variations in independent 
variables. F value shows overall significance of the model and here it is significant at probability value.  
Table 1   Impact of ownership concentration and ownership mix on EM 
Dependent Variable: EM   
Method: Panel EGLS (Cross-section weights)  
Periods included: 8   
Cross-sections included: 20   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 160  
Linear estimation after one-step weighting matrix 
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
C 0.276855 0.093328 2.966486 0.0035 
DIR_OWN -0.006822 0.002136 -3.193208 0.0017 
CONCENT -0.002725 0.000997 -2.732581 0.0070 
SISTER 0.003524 0.000940 -3.748480 0.0003 
GOVT -0.003440 0.001277 -2.693002 0.0079 
LOWN 0.000370 0.001070 0.345648 0.0004 
FOWN 0.002011 0.001562 1.287423 0.0013 
FINN -0.004546 0.001768 -2.570965 0.0111 
     
     
 Weighted Statistics   
     
R-squared 0.392428     Mean dependent var 0.110818 
Adjusted R-squared 0.364447     S.D. dependent var 0.237350 
S.E. of regression 0.192098     Sum squared resid 5.609064 
F-statistic 14.02514     Durbin-Watson stat 1.181513 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
Table 2 is showing cross section fixed effect of independent variables on dependent variables. In we check the 
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value of Schwarz criterion. If it is small then we can include this effect in our model. Here its value is 2.46% which 
is small and it is good for model. 
Table 2   Cross section fixed effects 
Dependent Variable: EM   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Periods included: 8   
Cross-sections included: 20   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 160  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.247139 0.291261 0.848513 0.3977 
DIR_OWN -0.001999 0.004637 -0.431072 0.6671 
CONCENT 0.000673 0.002503 0.268669 0.7886 
SISTER -0.002129 0.002447 -0.870259 0.3857 
GOVT -0.005234 0.012589 -0.415753 0.6783 
LOWN 8.74E-05 0.004325 0.020202 0.9839 
FOWN -0.000706 0.003596 -0.196256 0.8447 
FINN -0.008489 0.006282 -1.351442 0.1788 
     
      Effects Specification   
     
     Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
     
     R-squared 0.484475    Mean dependent var 0.075637 
Adjusted R-squared 0.383696    S.D. dependent var 0.223041 
S.E. of regression 0.175099    Akaike info criterion -0.494259 
Sum squared resid 4.077719    Schwarz criterion 0.024677 
Log likelihood 66.54071    Hannan-Quinn criter. -0.283537 
F-statistic 4.807287    Durbin-Watson stat 1.860081 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
Table 3 checks the combine effect of cross and time period fixed effect on variables included in the study. Again 
we examine the value of Schwarz criterion which is 8.95% and it is good for model of the study. We can also 
include time period effect in our model and equation specification along with cross section fixed affect. 
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Table 3   Cross section and time period fixed effect 
Dependent Variable: EM   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Periods included: 8   
Cross-sections included: 20   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 160  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.012926 0.294110 0.043949 0.9650 
DIR_OWN -0.002526 0.004501 -0.561272 0.5756 
CONCENT 0.001939 0.002475 0.783121 0.4350 
SISTER -0.000223 0.002431 -0.091539 0.9272 
GOVT 0.005724 0.012929 0.442742 0.6587 
LOWN 0.002521 0.004315 0.584261 0.5601 
FOWN 0.000935 0.003509 0.266393 0.7904 
FINN -0.007986 0.006050 -1.319944 0.1892 
     
      Effects Specification   
     
     Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
Period fixed (dummy variables)  
     
     R-squared 0.559469    Mean dependent var 0.075637 
Adjusted R-squared 0.444092    S.D. dependent var 0.223041 
S.E. of regression 0.166298    Akaike info criterion -0.563964 
Sum squared resid 3.484530    Schwarz criterion 0.089511 
Log likelihood 79.11710    Hannan-Quinn criter. -0.298610 
F-statistic 4.849043    Durbin-Watson stat 1.996645 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
However, not all fixed effects are significantly different from zero. Therefore in table 4 we tested whether there is 
unobserved heterogeneity. There are two ways of testing for unobserved heterogeneity. The first is a test called 
‘Redundant Fixed Effects Tests’. And second is Wald test which is shown in table 5. The p-values associated to 
the F-statistic and the Chi-square statistics are both 0.0000, which provides strong evidence against the null 
hypothesis that the fixed effects are all equal to each other. This suggests that there is unobserved heterogeneity. 
Table 4   Redundant fixed effect test 
Redundant Fixed Effects Tests   
Equation: Untitled   
Test cross-section and period fixed effects  
     
     Effects Test Statistic   d.f.  Prob.  
     
     Cross-section F 3.813034 (19,126) 0.0000 
Cross-section Chi-square 72.678952 19 0.0000 
Period F 3.064234 (7,126) 0.0052 
Period Chi-square 25.152764 7 0.0007 
Cross-Section/Period F 3.599561 (26,126) 0.0000 
Cross-Section/Period Chi-square 88.875809 26 0.0000 
     
     Another way to test for unobserved heterogeneity is performing a Wald-test on the fixed effects coefficients. More 
specifically we test the H0= C(1)=0, C(2)=0, C(3)=0, C(4)=0, C(5)=0, C(6)=0, C(7)=0, C(8)=0. Table 1.2 shows 
the Wald test shows that all variables have significant impact on earning management. This can be seen by F value 
and probability value. So it rejects the null hypothesis that these independent variables do not effect earning 
management. This again suggests that there is unobserved heterogeneity. 
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Table 5 Restriction test 
Wald Test:   
Equation: Untitled  
    
    
Test Statistic Value df Probability 
    
    
F-statistic  17.99738 (8, 152)  0.0000 
Chi-square  143.9790  8  0.0000 
    
    
Null Hypothesis: C(1)=0, C(2)=0, C(3)=0, C(4)=0, C(5)=0, 
        C(6)=0, C(7)=0, C(8)=0  
Null Hypothesis Summary:  
    
    
Normalized Restriction (= 0) Value Std. Err. 
    
    
C(1)  0.276855  0.093328 
C(2) -0.006822  0.002136 
C(3) -0.002725  0.000997 
C(4)  0.003524  0.000940 
C(5) -0.003440  0.001277 
C(6)  0.000370  0.001070 
C(7)  0.002011  0.001562 
C(8) -0.004546  0.001768 
    
Restrictions are linear in coefficients. 
The random effects model assumes that the random effects are uncorrelated with the explanatory variables 
otherwise there would be an endogeneity problem, which in turn would make the estimators inconsistent. Here, 
firstly, we have applied cross section and period random effect individually in table 6 and 7 and then we have 
shown their two combine effect in table 8.  The Hausman Test for Correlated Random Effects tests this hypothesis 
and it is shown in table 9.  The test output is given below: 
Table 6 Cross section random effect 
Dependent Variable: EM   
Method: Panel EGLS (Cross-section random effects) 
Periods included: 8   
Cross-sections included: 20   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 160  
Swamy and Arora estimator of component variances 
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.159259 0.165497 0.962311 0.3374 
DIR_OWN -0.003217 0.003100 -1.037762 0.3010 
CONCENT -0.000654 0.001668 -0.392116 0.6955 
SISTER -0.001790 0.001742 -1.027626 0.3058 
GOVT -0.003385 0.002539 -1.333191 0.1845 
LOWN 0.001557 0.002058 0.756659 0.4504 
FOWN 0.001683 0.002428 0.692926 0.4894 
FINN -0.004230 0.003675 -1.151045 0.2515 
     
 Effects Specification   
   S.D.   Rho   
     
     
Cross-section random 0.109229 0.2801 
Idiosyncratic random 0.175099 0.7199 
     
 Weighted Statistics   
     
     
R-squared 0.088381    Mean dependent var 0.037295 
Adjusted R-squared 0.046399    S.D. dependent var 0.179784 
S.E. of regression 0.175564    Sum squared resid 4.685028 
F-statistic 2.105194    Durbin-Watson stat 1.669859 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.046201    
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Table 7 shows period random effect of all explanatory variables on earnings management. Here we can see that 
sister organizations, local and foreign investors are positively impacting earning management of banks at 5% level 
of significance. All values are statistically significant and carry positive values.  
Table 7 Period random effect 
Dependent Variable: EM   
Method: Panel EGLS (Period random effects)  
Periods included: 8   
Cross-sections included: 20   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 160  
Swamy and Arora estimator of component variances 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.257562 0.134977 1.908189 0.0583 
DIR_OWN -0.006697 0.002488 -2.692148 0.0079 
CONCENT -0.002497 0.001438 -1.735766 0.0846 
SISTER 0.002932 0.001401 -2.092379 0.0381 
GOVT -0.004347 0.001843 -2.358430 0.0196 
LOWN 0.000395 0.001537 0.256846 0.0476 
FOWN 0.002426 0.002228 1.088761 0.0280 
FINN -0.003868 0.002462 -1.570800 0.1183 
     
      Effects Specification   
   S.D.   Rho   
     
     Period random  6.88E-08 0.0000 
Idiosyncratic random 0.194548 1.0000 
     
      Weighted Statistics   
     
     R-squared 0.232257    Mean dependent var 0.075637 
Adjusted R-squared 0.196901    S.D. dependent var 0.223041 
S.E. of regression 0.199880    Sum squared resid 6.072721 
F-statistic 6.568997    Durbin-Watson stat 1.352551 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000001    
     
     in table 8 the top portion of the dialog displays basic information about the specification, including the method 
used to compute the component variances, as well as the coefficient estimates and associated statistics. The middle 
portion of the output shows the best-linear unbiased predictor estimates of the random effects themselves. The 
next portion of the output describes the estimates of the component variances. We see that the estimated cross-
section, period, and individual error component standard deviations are 11.09, 8.21 and 16.63 respectively. As 
seen from the values of Rho, these components comprise 0.26, 0.14 and 0.59 of the total variance. 
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Table 8 Two way random effect 
Dependent Variable: EM   
Method: Panel EGLS (Two-way random effects)  
Periods included: 8   
Cross-sections included: 20   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 160  
Swamy and Arora estimator of component variances 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.131225 0.163047 0.804831 0.4222 
DIR_OWN -0.003218 0.002997 -1.073887 0.2846 
CONCENT -0.000491 0.001602 -0.306492 0.7596 
SISTER -0.001203 0.001692 -0.710987 0.4782 
GOVT -0.002952 0.002487 -1.187216 0.2370 
LOWN 0.001888 0.002009 0.939690 0.3489 
FOWN 0.001314 0.002347 0.560009 0.5763 
FINN -0.004091 0.003594 -1.138269 0.2568 
     
      Effects Specification   
   S.D.   Rho   
     
     Cross-section random 0.110935 0.2636 
Period random  0.082054 0.1442 
Idiosyncratic random 0.166298 0.5923 
     
      Weighted Statistics   
     
     R-squared 0.078206    Mean dependent var 0.024632 
Adjusted R-squared 0.035755    S.D. dependent var 0.168200 
S.E. of regression 0.165166    Sum squared resid 4.146517 
F-statistic 1.842267    Durbin-Watson stat 1.749020 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.083051    
     
     Table 9 shows that the test fails to reject the null hypothesis at all confidence levels. This provides evidence that 
the assumption that the random effects should be uncorrelated to the explanatory variables is true for this dataset. 
Therefore it should not be problematic to estimate a random effects model.   
Table 9  Hausmen test 
Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test  
Equation: Untitled   
Test cross-section and period random effects  
     
     
Test Summary 
Chi-Sq. 
Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob.  
     
     Cross-section random 13.677028 7 0.0572 
Period random 0.960319 7 0.9954 
Cross-section and period random 8.309560 7 0.3061 
     
      
Discussion and Conclusion 
From the above results we have found that ownership by sister organizations, local and foreign investors positively 
affects earning management of the bank. Ownership by directors, major shareholders, government and financial 
institutions does not affect earning management of the banks. The companies with institutional investors are 
involved in more aggressive earnings management practices or companies with institutional investors tend to 
manipulate earnings upward more aggressively when their earnings before discretionary accruals are poor, and 
they downplay their earnings more than companies with individual investors when their earnings before 
discretionary accruals are exceptionally high (Rafik, 2002; Johri et al., 2008). 
When we measure impact of ownership on earning management, discretionary accruals as a proxy for 
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earnings management is negatively related both to managerial ownership and to ownership concentration. The 
results suggest that both managerial ownership and ownership concentration improve the quality of annual 
earnings by reducing the levels of earnings management (Bolton, 2006). 
The earnings management as represented by discretionary accruals have been regressed on the governance 
variables namely, ownership concentration, board size and proportion of independent directors. The results showed 
that sample with effective governance mechanism have insignificant relationship between ownership 
concentration and earnings management. The board structure however has significant relationship with earnings 
management. Regression results also show that earnings management is higher in a company with ineffective 
internal governance mechanism (Fan and Wong, 2002). 
 
Recommendations 
On the basis of results of study following steps should be taken by banks to improve earning management: 
1. Banks should try to use mix ownership structure in order to improve its earning management and to 
improve its corporate governance.  
2. Shares held by sister organizations can also bring about positive changes in managing the earnings of the 
banks.  
3. Ownership by local and foreign investors can also help to improve the control mechanism in the 
organizations.  
4. It will help to reduce agency cost and cost of capital in the organizations. Agency conflicts between 
managers and outsiders can be minimized by protecting their legal rights. 
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